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Abstract This paper propose a protocol for lottery and a protocol for auc-
tion on quantum Blockchain. Our protocol of lottery satisfies randomness, un-
predictability, unforgeability, verifiability, decentralization and unconditional
security. Our protocol of auction satisfies bid privacy, posterior privacy, bids
binding, decentralization and unconditional security. Except quantum Block-
chain, the main technique involved in both protocols is quantum bit commit-
ment. Since both quantum blockchain and quantum bit commitment can be
realized by the current technology, our protocols are practically feasible.
Keywords quantum blockchain · quantum bit commitment · lottery ·
auction
1 Introduction
A blockchain is a distributed, transparent and append-only ledger of crypto-
graphically linked units of data (blocks), which incorporates mechanisms for
achieving consensus over the blocks of data in a large decentralised network of
nodes which do not trust each other. It is a ledger in the sense that the data
entries stored on the blockchain can be considered as generalized transactions.
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It is a distributed system in the sense that all miners (the nodes that are in
charge of updating the ledger) have separated, identical copies of the ledger.
One of the most prominent applications of Blockchain technology is to enable
the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin [36]. Another
important application is the implementation of smart contracts [49], which are
enforceable, irrefutable agreements among mutually distrusting peers, which
do not imply a trusted third party for their affirmation and administration
mechanism.
The power of quantum computers and the capabilities of existing quantum
algorithms [41] represent a threat to most of the existing public-key crypto-
graphic systems. The current predictions [35] assume that by 2026 the chance
of the practical availability of quantum computers is about 15% and by 2031
the chance grows to 50%. As almost all existing Blockchain implementations
have very deep reliance on the public-key digital signatures and as they are
used for the transfer of value, they are particularly vulnerable to the attack
of quantum computers. As pointed out by Fedorov et al. [15], Blockchain
technology as we know it today may founder unless it integrates quantum
technologies.
There is a considerable amount of research related to the quantum-safe
Blockchain [26,2,44,47,48] which could withstand attacks powered by forth-
coming quantum computers. One of the most prominent proposals is the
Quantum-secured Blockchain (QB) developed by Kiktenko et al. [26]. Due
to the application of unconditionally secure message authentication based on
quantum key distribution methodology, QB is immune to the attacks of quan-
tum computers. The major limitation of QB is that the consensus protocol
it adopts is not efficient, because it becomes exponentially data-intensive if
a large number of cheating miners is present. This limitation is overcome in
[47], where a new consensus protocol is reported, exhibiting only quadratic
dependence of resources on the number of miners. In [48] the usage of quan-
tum blockchain is illustrated by designing a simple voting protocol based on
it. To further demonstrate the power and application potential of quantum
blockchain, in this paper we present protocols for lottery and auction based
on it.
Lottery is a multi-billion dollar industry [23]. In general, in a lottery there
is an authority and a number of players. Players buy tickets to participate in
the game. Then a random process is used to determine the winning tickets. In
many lotteries, the revenue is huge and so is the incentive to cheat. In order
to ensure fair play and the trust of players, an ideal lottery protocol [14,7,4,
5,18,33] should satisfy the following requirements:
1. Randomness. All tickets are equally likely to win.
2. Unpredictability. No player can predict the winning ticket.
3. Unforgeability. Tickets cannot be forged. Especially, it is impossible to
create a winning ticket after the outcome of the random process is known.
4. Verifiablity. The number and the revenue of winning tickets are publicly
verifiable.
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5. Decentralization. The random process does not rely on a single authority.
Lottery protocols that satisfy the above requirements already exist [14,
18]. With the advent of the quantum computing technology, it is reasonable
to further require lottery protocols to satisfy:
6. Unconditional security. Even an adversary with unlimited power of com-
putation cannot rig the lottery.
Although quantum coin flipping [17,43,37,3,39,42,19,38], a specific form of
lottery, has been researched in the past 20 years, only randomness and the
unconditional security have been studied in those works, while other properties
of lottery have rarely been addressed in the context of quantum coin flipping.
In this paper, for the first time, we design a lottery protocol which satisfies all
the above requirements.
Auction is an even more important business in the sense that trillions of
dollars are transferred by auctions. An auction is a process of buying and
selling goods by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling the
item to the buyer who offers the highest bid. In general, there are two types of
auction: sealed-bid auction and non-sealed-bid auction. The main advantage
of the sealed-bid auction lies in the fact that no buyer gets to know the bids
offered by other buyers. In the literature [9,10,34] it is acknowledged that an
ideal sealed-bid auction must satisfy the following properties:
1. Bid privacy. The submitted bids are not visible to other buyers during the
bidding phase.
2. Posterior privacy. The losing bids are not revealed to the public. In other
words, only the seller knows all losing bids and their corresponding buyers.
3. Bids binding. Buyers cannot deny or change their bids once they are com-
mitted.
In the setting of quantum blockchain, it is reasonable to require that the
auction protocol further satisfies the following properties:
4. Decentralization. The process of auction does not rely on a single trusted
third party.
5. Unconditional security. Even an adversary with unlimited power of com-
putation cannot manipulate the process of auction.
While blockchain-based auction [8,16] does satisfy decentralization and
quantum auction [28,51] does satisfy unconditional security, no existing auc-
tion protocol satisfies both of these properties. The auction protocol we are
going to propose satisfies all the above properties.
Except quantum blockchain, the main technique that we will use is quan-
tum bit commitment. We first review some background knowledge of quantum
blockchain and quantum bit commitment in Section 2. We then present our
lottery protocol in Section 3 and auction protocol in Section 4. We finish this
paper in Section 5 with conclusions and remarks on the future work.
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2 Background
2.1 Quantum Blockchain
The concept of quantum blockchain presented in [26,47,48], which we are go-
ing to explore for our lottery and auction protocols, assumes that each pair
of nodes is connected by a quantum channel and a classical channel. Every
pair of nodes can establish a sequence of secret keys by using the quantum key
distribution [6] mechanisms. Those keys will later be used for secure commu-
nication.
Updates (new transactions or new messages) on blockchain are initiated
by those nodes that wish to append some new data to the chain. Each miner
checks the consistency of the update with respect to their local copy of the
database and works out a judgment regarding the update’s admissibility. Then
all the miners apply a consensus algorithm to the update, arriving at a con-
sensus regarding the correct version of the update.
In this paper, we will consider quantum blockchain on a high level, omitting
its detailed structure and mechanism, and taking advantage of its following
desired properties:
1. Every node is a (small scale) quantum computer which can run some quan-
tum computation on a small number of qubits. More specifically, nodes are
capable of performing the quantum computation involved in at least one
quantum bit commitment protocol.
2. The communication between different nodes is unconditionally secure.
3. There is a consensus algorithm which can be used by all miners to achieve
consensus. The consensus mechanism is immune to attacks. A general def-
inition of the consensus algorithm is given as the following.
Definition 1 (consensus algorithm) An algorithm among n parties, in
which every party p holds an input value xp ∈ D (for some finite domain D)
and eventually decide on an output value in yp ∈ D, is said to achieve consensus
if the algorithm guarantees that the output value of all honest parties are the
same.
2.2 Quantum Bit Commitment
Bit commitment typically consists of two phases, namely: commitment and
opening. In the commitment phase, Alice, the sender, chooses a bit a (a = 0
or 1) which she wishes to commit to Bob, the receiver. Then Alice presents
Bob some evidence about the bit. The committed bit cannot be known to Bob
prior to the opening phase. Later, in the opening phase, Alice discloses some
information needed for the reconstruction of a. Then Bob reconstructs a bit a′
using Alice’s evidence and the disclosure. A correct bit commitment protocol
will ensure that a′ = a. A bit commitment protocol is concealing if Bob cannot
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know the bit Alice committed before the opening phase, and is binding if Alice
cannot change the bit she committed after the commitment phase.
The first quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol was proposed in 1984
by Bennett and Brassard [6]. A number of QBC protocols have been designed
to achieve unconditional security, such as those of [11,12]. Although accord-
ing to the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem [32,29,46], unconditionally
secure QBC cannot be achieved within the theory of quantum mechanics, sci-
entists have found ways to avoid this negative result in the past two decades.
For example, cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment (CSQBC) protocols
[20,13,40,27,52] and relativistic QBC protocols [24,25,30,1,31,50] have been
developed. With well-designed mechanisms of punishment, the CSQBC proto-
cols can be useful in practice and resilient to the attack of quantum computers.
Relativistic QBC protocols achieve unconditional security by making use of
the power of relativity theory. In [50], the authors implemented a relativistic
QBC protocol in which the bit is concealed for 24 hours. Another practically
useful QBC can be found in He [21,22], who proposed a QBC protocol based on
the use of Mach-Zehnder interferometer. He’s protocol is also implementable
by the current technology. To sum up, practically useful QBC protocols are
already available and are ready for applications to other computational tasks.
The following is an abstract yet rigorous definition of QBC, which can be
found in Sun et al. [46] and will be used in this paper.
Definition 2 (quantum bit commitment) A quantum bit commitment
protocol consists of the following:
(1) Two finite dimensional Hilbert spaces A and B.
(2) A function commit : {0, 1} 7→ A⊗B.
(3) Two pure states |c0〉, |c1〉 ∈ A⊗ B, in which |ci〉 = commit(i) is the com-
mitment of i.
(4) A quantum operation (i.e. completely positive, trace-preserving super op-
erator) Open on A⊗B such that Open(|c0〉〈c0|) 6= Open(|c1〉〈c1|).
This QBC protocol is concealing if TrA(|c0〉〈c0|) = TrA(|c1〉〈c1|). It is binding
if there is no unitary U on A such that (U ⊗ IB)|c0〉 = |c1〉.
3 Lottery on quantum blockchain
Now let us present our lottery protocol. In the setting of lottery, we assume
there are n players and every ticket of the lottery is an m-bit string. Our
lottery protocol consists of 3 phases: the ticket purchasing phase, the ticket
agreement phase and the winner determination phase. Figure 1 presents sim-
plified visualization of our protocol.
1. Ticket purchasing:
(a) For every player pi ∈ {p1, . . . , pn}, to purchase a ticket Ti, pi uses
QBC to commit Ti to all miners. At the end of this phase, every miner
possesses a list of commitments (commit(T1), . . . , commit(Tn)).
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player1 miner1
player2 miner2
commit
commit
commit
CA
Fig. 1: A network of players and miners: Players commit their tickets to miners.
Miners use a consensus algorithm (CA) to achieve consensus about the players’
tickets.
2. Ticket agreement:
(a) Every player opens his commitment to every miner, so that the commit-
ments in every miner’s possession change to (Open(commit(T1)), . . . ,
Open(commit(Tn))), which essentially equals to (T1, . . . , Tn).
(b) All the miners run a consensus algorithm to achieve a consensus on the
tickets (T1, . . . , Tn) purchased by players. Every miner adds (T1, . . . , Tn)
to his local copy of the blockchain.
3. Winner determination:
(a) The winning ticket is calculated by bit-wise XOR: T = T1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Tn.
(b) A player’s revenue is determined by the Hamming distance between his
ticket and the winning ticket T . The closer his ticket is to the winning
ticket, the higher is his revenue.1
3.1 Analysis
Our lottery protocol satisfies the following requirements:
1. Randomness.
The winning ticket is calculated by bit-wise XOR. For every index j ∈
{1, . . . ,m} in the winning ticket, T [j] = 1 iff T1[j] ⊕ . . . ⊕ Tn[j] = 1.
Therefore, the probability of T [j] = 1 is the same as T [j] = 0.
2. Unpredictability.
To predict the winning ticket a player has to know all tickets before they
are opened. The concealing property of QBC ensures that even miners
cannot know the players’ tickets before they are opened. Since tickets are
only sent to the miners by QBC, the probability that a player knows all
tickets is even lower than the probability that a miner knows them.
3. Unforgeability.
The binding property of QBC ensures that it is impossible to change a
ticket after the ticket purchasing phase.
1 A specific rule of revenue which satisfies this principle is beyond the scope of this paper
and is left for future work.
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buyer1 miner1
seller
buyer2 miner2
commit
commit-open
commit
commit-open
verify
verify
commit
CA
Fig. 2: A network of the seller, buyers and miners.
4. Verifiablity.
This is because the quantum blockchain is a transparent database. After the
ticket agreement phase the list (T1, . . . Tn) is added to the blockchain. Every
player can read all the other players’ tickets and calculate the winning ticket
by himself.
5. Decentralization.
The random process does not rely on a single authority. Every player’s
ticket essentially affects the calculation of the winning ticket.Moreover, the
calculation of the winning ticket does not rely on a single miner, but on all
miners.
6. Unconditional security.
Even an adversary with an unlimited power of computation cannot manip-
ulate the lottery protocol. The concealing and binding property of QBC
does not rely on any computational assumption. Nor does the security of
the consensus algorithm. The unconditional security of the ledger is further
guarantied by the unconditional security of the digital signature schemes
adopted by quantum Blockchain.
4 Auction on quantum blockchain
In our protocol of auction, we assume three types of participants: one seller S,
m buyers {B1, . . . , Bm} and n miners {M1, . . . ,Mn}. Our protocol works as
follows: First all buyers send their bids to the seller. Then the seller calculates
which buyer is the winner. Finally, all miners verify the seller’s calculation.
Figure 2 is a brief visualization of the process of auction. There are 5 phases
in our protocol.
1. The bidding phase: Every buyer Bi commits his bid bi to the seller and to
all miners Mj , where bi is a positive integer.
2. The opening phase: Every buyer opens his bid to the seller.
8 Xin Sun et al.
3. Decision phase: The seller calculates the winning bid, which is the highest
bid (if there is a tie, then one of the maximal bids is chosen randomly),
and the winning buyer, who has offered the winning bid.
4. Verification phase: In this phase the seller S and every miner Mj run the
following procedure to convince Mj that S has chosen the valid winner:
(a) S sends the information about the winning buyer Bw and his bid bw to
the miner Mj.
(b) S permutes losing bids to obtain a new list of m−1 bids (b′
1
, . . . , b′m−1).
(c) S sends b′
1
, . . . , b′m−1 to Mj.
(d) Mj first checks if bw ≥ b
′
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}. If yes, then Mj
sends (bw, b
′
1
, . . . , b′m−1) to all buyers. Otherwise,Mj sets S as a cheater
and outputs ⊥.
(e) After receiving (bw, b
′
1
, . . . , b′m−1), every buyer Bi checks if his bid is in
the list, i.e. there is some b′k = bi. If yes, then Bi sends the message
“valid” toMj. Otherwise Bi opens bi toMj .Mj then sets S as a cheater
and outputs ⊥.
(f) If Mj does not output ⊥, then the seller passes the verification phase.
The output of Mj is now (bw, b
′
1
, . . . , b′m−1, Bw)
5. Publication phase: All miners run the consensus algorithm to achieve con-
sensus on the output of the verification phase. The consensus is then added
to the blockchain.
4.1 Analysis
Our auction protocol satisfies the following requirements:
1. Bid privacy.
Every buyer only commits and opens his bids to the seller. Therefore, no
buyer knows other buyers’s bid.
2. Posterior privacy.
What is added to the blockchain is the winning buyer and his bid, as well as
a permuted list of losing bids. Therefore, no losing buyer’s bid is revealed.
3. Bids binding.
Binding property of quantum bit commitment ensures that buyers cannot
deny or change their bids once they are committed.
4. Decentralization.
There are in total n miners. The process of auction does not rely on a
single miner.
5. Unconditional security.
As in the case of our lottery protocol, even an adversary with an unlimited
power of computation cannot manipulate the auction protocol because the
security of the quantum bit commitment and consensus algorithm does
not depend on computational complexity. The unconditional security of
the ledger relies on quantum Blockchain properties.
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5 Conclusions and future work
This paper proposes a lottery protocol and an auction protocol based on quan-
tum bit commitment and quantum blockchain. These protocols satisfy all the
important properties of distributed lottery/auction and are implementable by
the current technology.
In the future, we are interested in applying quantum blockchain to the
general field of multi-party computation. We believe that quantum blockchain
will provide new insights into these interesting tasks. We estimate that in the
future more complicated protocols (smart contracts) on quantum blockchain
will be designed. Developing a formal tool for the specification and verification
of smart contracts on quantum blockchain is on our agenda. The recently
developed categorical logic of quantum programs [45] seems to be a good
starting point.
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